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Abstract
Bank branches in New York City tend to be spatially clustered. For instance,
of the 221 branches that were opened in New York City between July, 1990
and June, 1995, 181 (or 82 percent) were opened in census tracts that already
had at least one other branch. A number of recent theoretical papers have
highlighted the possibility of rational herding in various arenas of economic
activity. This paper explores empirically whether the apparent clustering of
bank branches can be at least partially attributed to rational herding by banks.
We find that even after controlling for the expected profitability of operating a
branch in an area, branch openings follow other, existing branches. Moreover,
such bandwagon behavior appears to reduce branch profits. These findings,
combined, suggest that herd behavior may be a factor in the branch location
decisions of banks.
**The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. Corresponding
author: Shubham Chaudhuri, Department of Economics, Columbia University MC-3308, New York,
NY 10027; e-mail: sc301@columbia.edu.
1. Introduction
Bank branches in New York City (and in other metropolitan areas) tend to be
spatially clustered. For instance, of the 913 bank branches that were in operation
in New York City in June, 1990, 66 percent were located in census tracts where
there was at least one other branch even though 79 percent of the census tracts had
no branches. Moreover, of the 221 branches that were opened in New York City
between July, 1990 and June, 1995, 181 (or 82 percent) were opened in tracts that
already had at least one other branch. The aim of this paper is to explore empirically
whether the apparent clustering of bank branches can be at least partially attributed
to rational herding by banks.
The term "rational herding" has been used to describe situations in which it is
individually rational for agents /firms to mimic the actions of others even though
such mimicry can potentially lead to aggregate outcomes that are sub-optimal.1 A
number of recent theoretical papers have highlighted the possibility of rational herd-
ing in various arenas of economic activity. These models have been used to explain
stylized facts about the clustering of retail stores, patterns of technology adoption,
voter choice and even fertility decisions. The idea that imitative behavior can be
both individually rational and socially inefficient has intrinsic intuitive appeal. But
there have been relatively few attempts to empirically test these models and formal
statistical evidence of rational herding is rare. In this paper, we attempt such a test.
We focus on bank branch location for two reasons. First, branching offers several
advantages as an arena in which to test for rational herding. As indicated above,
bank branches tend to be spatially clustered. Moreover, the branch location decision
appears to have many of the ingredients that theoretical models suggest are con-
ducive to rational herd behavior, suggesting that such behavior may drive branch
location decisions. To begin with, there is considerable uncertainty about the prof-
itability of opening a branch in any given neighborhood and uncertainty about the
right course of action is a prerequisite for most types of rational herding. Next, the
costs of setting up a branch are substantial, as are the costs, both direct and indirect
of closing a branch. These costs suggest that banks are at least partially locked in
to the locations they choose for their branches and this makes it more likely that
herding, if it exists, can be detected. Third, the branch location choice represents a
discrete action—to enter or not enter a neighborhood—and the discreteness of the
action space has been emphasized in some herding models. And lastly, the fact that
banks generally expand their networks of branches at different times means that
in deciding where to locate their branches, banks have an opportunity to observe
where other banks have located their branches. These features of the branch lo-
cation decision do not, of course, imply that rational herding will occur; but they
suggest that it might.
If herding occurs in the location of bank branches, branch data are particularly
useful in detecting such behavior. Any test of herding must separate those cases
xNote that this definition of herding is quite specific in that it excludes situations in which agents
act independently but similarly as well as situations in which imitative behavior is both individually
and socially efficient. We use the more neutral term "clustering" to refer, in a purely descriptive
sense, to situations where agents appear to be taking similar actions but may or may not be herding.
where agents behave similarly because they receive identical public information from
the instances where agents mimic others who preceded them. This requires a great
deal of knowledge about the information available to agents. For instance, testing for
herding in financial markets may be difficult because the investigator may not know
much about what information was commonly available to all the agents involved.
But banks rely primarily on the limited information in the Census and other public
data sources when locating branches, and this information is also available to us.
Even if all banks have access to some information that we lack, and we allow for this
possibility in our empirical work, relative to other industries, we can better control
for the information available to banks in the context of branching.
A second reason we focus on bank branch location is that understanding the
factors underlying the branch location decisions of banks is itself of policy interest.
Bank branches tend to be unevenly distributed. This unevenness has attracted
considerable attention, both in the popular media and in policy circles because
community groups argue that a bricks-and-mortar branch presence is important for
access to banking services. They point out, for example, that retail customers who
need to cash checks and open savings accounts have few good substitutes for banks.2
As a result, banks face pressure to maintain a branch presence in "underserved
areas." For example, in several recent bank mergers, the acquirer promised to not
close existing branches in low-income neighborhoods. And, in a landmark decision
in 1994, the Department of Justice announced a consent decree with Chevy Chase
Federal Savings Bank in Maryland (which had most of its branches in relatively
affluent neighborhoods of Washington, D.C.), whereby that bank agreed to open
several offices in minority neighborhoods of Washington, D.C. (Banking Policy Re-
port (1994)).
Such interventions, whether in the form of public pressure exerted indirectly
through the regulatory process governing mergers, or direct ones of the type faced
by Chevy Chase Bank may be warranted if the existing spatial distribution of bank
branches reflects an underlying market failure and is therefore, in some sense, socially
sub-optimal.3 There is, however, little agreement on whether that is the case. The
uneven distribution of branches partly reflects the uneven distribution of profitable
opportunities. Branches may be clustered simply because the underlying demand
for banking services is clustered.
However, the possibility that banks may discriminate against certain neighbor-
hoods and individuals and refuse to provide banking services to such individuals and
neighborhoods ("redlining") has received considerable attention recently.4 Such be-
havior, if it exists, could produce a distribution of bank branches that is more skewed
than the distribution of the demographic and economic factors that affect branch
2
 For example, check-cashing outlets often charge fees of up to $9 to cash a $500 payroll check
(Caskey (1991)). Glassman (1995) provides an opposing point of view, arguing that there are
a number of alternative service providers and that "banks are not necessarily the only—or the
best—source of financial services for low-income communities."
The appropriate form of intervention would, of course, still depend on the nature of the un-
derlying market failure. It is also important here to distinguish between a situation where the
distribution is sub-optimal from a purely efficiency perspective—the source of the inefficiency being
a market failure in the banking sector—and one where the criterion for optimality is somewhat
broader and includes equity considerations. The two have at times been confused in the policy
debate.
4Tootell (1996) is the most recent example, and contains references to previous research.
profitability, and this may justify policy intervention.
In this paper, we illustrate the possibility that a different type of market failure,
rational herding based on, for example, information externalities, may provide a
partial explanation for the uneven distribution of branches. This type of market
failure implies a different policy intervention to promote a more even distribution
of branches, namely a subsidy for opening branch offices in thinly branched ar-
eas. There has been surprisingly little empirical work on the factors underlying the
branch location decisions of banks. Nearly all studies of redlining have focused on
lending. Avery (1991) is one of the few papers we have been able to identify that
directly examines the branch location choices of banks. Nor has there been, to the
best of our knowledge, any discussion of alternative explanations such as rational
herding for the uneven distribution of bank branches.5 This paper aims to fill both
these gaps.
We propose the following simple test of herd behavior. Controlling for the ex-
pected profitability of operating in a given tract, the probability of a branch being
opened in a tract should not, in the absence of herding, increase with the number
of existing branches in that tract (or should depend negatively to the extent that
competition is tougher in neighborhoods with a large number of branches). We test
this hypothesis using a new, extensive dataset on New York City census tracts for
the 1990-95 period. We find that, consistent with the hypothesis of herding, banks
are more likely to open branches in tracts where there are already other branches,
ceteris paribus.
We then test the robustness of this finding and clarify its interpretation. This
further test is motivated by our concern that the statistically significant positive
relationship between branch openings and the number of existing branches that
we take as evidence of herding may be spurious, arising instead from unobserved
(to us, but not to the banks) determinants of profitability. Using deposits as a
proxy for branch profitability, we find that profits decrease when banks follow other
banks' branches. This suggests that the observed pattern of branch openings fol-
lowing existing branches cannot be explained in terms of existing branches proxying
for unmeasured determinants of profitability. The fact that average deposits per
branch decrease with the number of branches in a tract also suggests that the herd
behavior that we document stems from either informational externalities or reputa-
tional concerns rather than from positive locational externalities, e.g., agglomeration
externalities due to consumer search behavior.
The next section provides some background on branch banking and presents ev-
idence on the spatial clustering of bank branches and branch openings—the starting
point for our analysis. In the following section, Section 3, we discuss the literature on
rational herding and describe how it might explain the clustering of bank branches.
Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and provides a description of the data we
use. In Section 5, we present the evidence on herding. Section 6 discusses alterna-
tive interpretations of the evidence. Section 7 concludes with some implications for
policy.
5An exception is Lang and Nakamura (1993) which presents a model (that we discuss in more
detail later) of mortgage redlining that yields herding based on a dynamic information externality.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Branch banking
Despite the growth, in the last fifteen years, of a number of alternative mechanisms
for delivering banking services (such as ATMs, phone banking, PC banking, and cen-
tralized loan originations), banks continue to rely on traditional, brick-and-mortar
branches.6 The primary reason for this is that though ATMs and phone banking are
widely used, their usage is typically limited to specialized functions such as informa-
tion inquiries and withdrawals. Bank customers continue to use branches to make
deposits. For example, a 1995 Master Card Survey of major retail banks found that
nearly 90 percent of all deposits are done in branches (Mead (1997)).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks investigate potential branch locations
carefully. They often hire market survey firms to produce site studies. Moreover,
banks appear to use a fine geographic grid when scouting for branch location sites,
suggesting that they do not believe that locating a branch just anywhere in a city
will do. A prominent market survey firm that helps banks locate branches, informs
us that client banks typically define a "trade area" for a branch to consist of 2000-
2500 households. This is not much larger than the typical New York City census
tract, which had 1253 households in 1990. New York City census tracts cover a very
small geographic area, often no more than a few square blocks.
Banks may find it important to locate branches carefully for several reasons.
The first is that customers appear to value proximity to a branch. A 1996 American
Banker survey showed that the majority of bank customers who switched banks did
so because they wanted to be closer to a branch (Kutler (1996)). Not surprisingly,
the same survey found that the average bank customer visited a branch of her bank
at least three times a month. When customers value proximity, banks cannot locate
a branch anywhere and expect customers to use ATMs, etc. to bank over a distance.
A second reason for locating branches carefully is that branch profitability is
uncertain, and there are substantial fixed costs of opening and closing branches. A
banking market research firm informs us that banks are often unable to explain the
wide variation in the performance of their own branches, and that the research firm
is often hired by banks to determine the causes of such performance differences.
As for the fixed costs of operating a branch, anecdotal evidence suggests that such
expenses are considerable. The typical branch costs approximately $1.5 million to
set up (mostly in real estate and construction costs).7 Fixed costs of operating
a branch (wages and maintenace costs) add approximately $1.4 million annually
(Radecki, et al). Since the typical branch carries $50 million in deposits, the cost of
setting up a branch represents a one-time addition of 300 basis points to the cost of
deposit funds, and fixed operating costs add another 280 basis points annually.
Closing a branch is a costly process. Banks are required to submit a notice of
a proposed closing with regulators no later than ninety days prior to the closing
date. The required notice must include a detailed statement of the reasons for the
decision to close a branch, and statistical and other information supporting the
reasons. Although banks do not need regulator approval to close an unprofitable
6Nationwide, the number of bank and thrift offices declined only slightly between 1990 and 1995
from 84,419 in 1990 to 81,875 in 1995 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1996)).
7Set-up costs are estimates based on various industry sources.
branch, they face considerable pressure from community groups to keep branches
open. In several recent instances, banks that were party to mergers committed
themselves to retain existing branches in low-income neighborhoods.8
2.2. Evidence on branch clustering
The population of New York City banks encompasses a wide range of institutions,
from large money center banks to many small, retail banks. Ninety one independent
banks and bank holding companies operated 844 branches in New York City in
June, 1995. Of these, four large institutions (Bank of New York, Citibank, Chase
Manhattan Bank and Chemical Bank) owned 490 offices. In this section we provide
some basic descriptive statistics documenting the spatial clustering of both bank
branches as well as branch openings in New York City. The data used to generate
these descriptive statistics are described in more detail in a later section.
Table 1 depicts the spatial distribution of bank branches at the census tract
level for two years, 1990 (top panel) and 1995 (bottom panel). The first column of
each panel provides a breakdown of census tracts, by the number of branches in the
tract as of June of the relevant year, i.e., 1990 or 1995; the second column shows the
distribution of branches, by the number of branches in the tract in which the branch
was located. These numbers indicate that in both 1990 and 1995, bank branches
tended to be located in tracts where there were already other branches, while many
tracts remained without branches (and the basic pattern is repeated in all of the
years 1990-1995). For instance, looking at the top panel we find that of the 913
branches in existence in New York City as of June 1990, 66 percent were located in
tracts where there was at least one other branch. Meanwhile,79 percent of the 2218
census tracts had no branches. That is, all 913 branches were concentrated in only
21 percent of all census tracts. This pattern had not changed in 1995 (as seen in
the lower panel of Table I).9
The spatial distribution of bank branches, observed in any given year, is the
outcome of branch location decisions made by banks over an extended period of
time. As such, the apparent clustering of existing bank branches may simply be the
remnant of clustering in the past and need not therefore suggest that clustering is an
ongoing phenomenon. More direct evidence on clustering can therefore be obtained
from the spatial distribution of branch openings, which is depicted in Table 2.
The first column of the top panel of Table 2 provides a breakdown of census
tracts by the number of branch openings in the tract between July, 1990 and June,
1995; the second column shows the distribution of branch openings, by the number
of branch openings in the tract in which the branch was opened. There were 221
branch openings between July, 1990 and June, 1995, and these were concentrated
For instance, Chemical Bank and Chase Mahattan Bank—when they proposed merging in
1995—promised to keep open even unprofitable branches in certain areas. "Executives at Chase and
Chemical sought...to allay...fears [that they would close branches in poorer neighborhoods], saying
that they intended to continue serving poor neighborhoods, even if that meant losing money. No
branch will be closed, they vowed, if it is more than three blocks away from another now operated
by either of their companies. 'That means, it is going to stay open, even if it's a dog,' said Kenneth
Hertz, a Chemical spokesman." (Lueck (1995)).
9
 These figures probably under-estimate the degree of branch clustering because tracts with
branches are likely to be themselves clustered and not uniformly distributed among the branchless
tracts.
in 142 (i.e., 7%) of the 2218 tracts. Of the 221 branch'openings, 53 percent (or 117)
took place in tract where there was at least one other branch opening during the
five-year period.
The bottom panel of Table 2 provides perhaps the clearest indication of branch
clustering. The first column shows the breakdown of the census tracts in which
there were branch openings, by the number of branches that existed in the tract
at the beginning of the period, i.e., in June, 1990. Here we see that 75 percent of
all census tracts that experienced a branch opening between July, 1990 and June,
1995, already had a branch. More striking still is the fact that 82 percent of the 221
branches that were opened over this five-year period, opened in tracts with at least
one other branch at the beginning of the period (see the second column).
The simplest and most obvious explanation for the clustering of bank branches
documented above is that the demand for banking products and services is itself
spatially clustered. It is certainly true that not all neighborhoods in New York
City offer the same potential customer base for banks. And if the disparities across
neighborhoods in the extent of demand is sufficient to outweigh the adverse effects
of increased competition, banks—like Willie Sutton—might simply be following the
money and locating in those areas with significant demand for banking services.
Table 3 reports some summary statistics that suggest that there is indeed some
basis for this explanation. Tracts with existing bank branches as of June, 1990,
as well as tracts in which branches were opened between June, 1990 and June,
1995, appear to be more affluent along a number of observable dimensions that are
plausible indicators of the demand for banking services. For instance, the tracts
that had branches (in June, 1990) had, on average, larger populations, fewer poor
households, a better-educated population, higher median household income, and
more workers and were, on average, more commercial. The same is true of tracts in
which branches were opened between July, 1990 and June, 1995.
However, Table 3 also reveals that branches were more likely to be opened in
tracts that already had more existing branches. On average, there were nearly
3 existing branches (in June, 1990) in the tracts in which branches were opened
between July, 1990 and June, 1995; on the other hand, the average number of
branches in the tracts in which no branches were opened during the five-year period,
was less than one. This stark contrast at least raises the possibility that the observed
clustering may be partly due to some form of rational herding.
3. Rational herding and the clustering of bank branches
A large literature on rational herding has emerged in recent years.10 The literature
suggests several different channels through which herding can arise. At least three
of the suggested channels seem to us to be ways in which rational herding might
occur in the location of bank branches. We describe them below.
In information cascade models, the possibility of herding stems from an infor-
mation externality (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992),
Welch (1992)). The typical setup in these models has agents choosing from a set
of actions according to a predetermined sequence. Each agent receives a condition-
ally independent private signal about the correct action to take and is also able to
10Devenow &: Welch (1996) and Gale (1996) provide very useful overviews of the literature.
observe the actions, but not the signals, of those who preceded her. Using both
her private information as well as the public information embodied in the choices of
others, each agent updates her priors about the profitability of alternative actions
and then chooses accordingly.
If the action space is coarse relative to the signal space, agents may not be able
to adequately tailor their chosen action to reflect both their private information as
well as the public information. They may rationally choose, then, to ignore their
own information and base their decision on the public information—i.e., faced with a
choice between acting upon her own private signal and imitating the choices of those
who acted before, it may be optimal for an agent to choose the latter. But in doing
so the agent ignores the fact that her private information is lost to those who follow
her since her private information is not recoverable from her publicly observable
action. This is the information externality at the heart of these models. If agents
have identically distributed signals, all subsequent agents face an identical situation
and consequently also choose to ignore their private information. The result is an
information cascade. And depending on the initial pattern of choices, the actions of
agents may well converge on the wrong choice—i.e., in rational herding.
Information cascades represent an extreme form of herding in which the actions
of early agents completely dominate the private signals of later agents. Lang and
Nakamura (1993) present a model of mortgage redlining in which a somewhat weaker
form of herding takes place. The information externality in their model stems from
the fact that the actions of predecessors affect the precision of the information
available to subsequent agents. In their model, the precision of appraisals—on which
mortgage lenders base the size of required down payments—depends on the volume
of previous home sales in a neighborhood. Appraisals are based on the prices at
which previous sales were transacted because these provide noisy signals of current
property values. The higher the number of previous home sales, the more precise
the appraisals, and the lower the required down payments. Lower down payment
requirements in turn lead to a larger number of approved mortgage loans and hence,
a larger number of current sales. The positive feedback mechanism thus generated
raises the possibility of herding and sub-optimal differences in mortgage lending
activity across neighborhoods.
A third possible channel through which rational herding might arise is through
the reputational concerns of agents when the calibre/quality of agents is unknown.
In Scharfstein and Stein (1990), one of the first models of this kind, better (in-
formed) managers receive informative signals about the right course of action, and
the errors in these signals are correlated. Uninformative signals, those received by
uninformed managers, are, on the other hand, uncorrelated. The compensation
(future prospects) of a manager depends on his reputation—i.e., on whether he is
regarded as informed or not. In this situation, each manager has an incentive to
mimic the actions of managers who have acted before him, because by doing so he
maximize his chances of appearing informed. If the action results in a good outcome,
he benefits; even if the action, ex-post, yields a bad outcome, the fact that other
managers made a similar choice shields the manager, enabling him to 'hide in the
herd', in effect, to argue that the decision was, ex-ante, an informed one. On the
other hand, were the manager to act upon his private signal, where such a signal
suggests a course of action different from that taken by other managers, he would
run the risk of appearing uninformed if the action resulted, ex-post, in a poor out-
come. Other examples of this type of herding based on reputational concerns and
relative performance are provided in Zweibel (1995) and in DeCoster and Strange
(1993). The latter apply the Scharfstein and Stein (1990) model to the siting deci-
sions faced by real-estate developers concerned about their reputations with banks.
The herding in these models is based on two key premises: first, that there exists an
agency problem in that the incentives of decision-makers are not aligned with the
outcomes of their decisions; and second, that the compensation of agents is based
in some way on relative performance standards.
Any of the three types of models described above can plausibly be applied to
explain the clustering, (and possibly rational herding), of bank branches. These
models assume uncertainty of outcomes and (some) irreversibility of decisions. Both
conditions are observed in branching, as we noted in Section 2. All three assume that
agents act sequentially in an exogenously determined order and that the actions of
agents are publicly observable.11 Banks appear, in general, to expand their branch
networks at different points in time based on a number of different factors that
are arguably exogenous to the branch location decision itself. And in making their
branch location decisions, banks are clearly able to observe the locations chosen by
other banks.12
Cascade models require, in addition, a discrete action space (or at least that the
signal space is large relative to the action space). Incorrect cascades are prevented
when the action space is fine enough for the private information of firms to be recov-
erable from their chosen actions. Whether one views the branch location decision
as a series of binary decisions about opening or not opening a branch in each of a
number of neighborhoods, or whether one views it as a single decision about the
best neighborhood in which to locate a branch, branch location represents a discrete
choice.13 When a bank chooses not to open a branch in a neighborhood, or even
if it does, the strength of its private information about the profit potential of the
11A separate strand of the literature on informational externalities relaxes this assumption and
allows agents to choose when to act (Hendricks & Kovenock (1988), Caplin and Leahy (1993),
Chamley and Gale (1994), Gul and Lindholm (1995)). In these endogenous timing models, all
agents have an incentive to wait because the actions of early movers provide additional information
that can improve the quality of the decisions made by late movers. The resulting equilibrium
resembles a war of attrition in which agents try to out-wait others and this leads to sub-optimal
delays in action.
There are two main differences between these models and the ones we discussed above. The
first is that the clustering of agents' actions in endogenous timing models need not be inefficient;
the second is that the inefficiency always takes the form of 'underinvestment' because of excessive
delay. In sequential action models, on the other hand, 'overinvestment' (excessive clustering) is also
a possibility.
1
 A slightly tricky point here is whether or not banks actually observe that certain locations were
rejected by other banks. To the extent that banks, in principle, consider all neighborhoods within
the city (subject to some obvious exceptions) to be potential sites for new branches, the location
choices that are actually made implicitly indicate that other sites were rejected.
While it is true that branch location could be thought of as a selection from a continuum of
possible sites, for this to eliminate the possibility of herding it would have to be the case that banks
gain from being "close" to the true optimal site—e.g., have a payoff function that is concave in the
action space (see Lee (1993)). This seems unlikely, especially in New York City, where fairly affluent
neighborhoods often adjoin more depressed areas and there does not appear to be any discernible
monotonicity in the geographical positioning of neighborhoods according to their level of affluence.
This suggests that banks face a payoff function similar to that in Banerjee (1992), which, because
of its "all-or-nothing" form, effectively discretizes the action space and thus allows the possibility
of herding.
neighborhood is not revealed. All that other banks are able to observe is the discrete
location choice. And because they rationally infer from this choice that the bank's
private signal was not strong enough to warrant a different course of action, these
other banks may choose to (not) locate branches in neighborhoods where the bank
chose to (not) locate its branch. In the process, banks may ignore their private in-
formation that alternative locations are equally profitable (or even more profitable)
and this can result in overclustering of branches in some neighborhoods while other
neighborhoods remain underserved.
If banks care about the precision of the information available to them about
the profit potential of alternative neighborhoods, they may also choose to locate
branches in tracts with a larger number of existing branches. The presence of one
or more existing bank branches in a neighborhood can provide additional sources
of information—though branch-level profit figures are usually not available, data on
branch-level deposits are readily obtained—and such information, when combined
with any private information that the bank has acquired through, for instance, site
analysis studies can reduce the uncertainty surrounding the profitability of opening
a branch in a neighborhood.
Reputational concerns may also influence the branch-location decision if the
evaluation (and compensation) of managers is based partly on the ex-post relative
profitability of their branch-siting decisions. From the perspective of a manager
responsible for making the branch location decision, it may be much more attractive
to locate a branch in a neighborhood where there are already several other existing
branches than to venture into a virgin neighborhood, even when the latter appears
to have significant potential. By doing so, the manager avoids the possibility that
he will be blamed for poor judgement.
The discussion above has been in largely heuristic terms. We have not writ-
ten down a specific structural model of bank branch location. Partly this is due
to the fact that we remain agnostic, at this point, about which of these specific
models applies in the case of bank branch location. A more important reason is
that we cannot, at this stage, empirically distinguish between the alternative chan-
nels through which herding might be occurring. Our empirical strategy is based,
therefore, on what might be considered the common reduced form implication of
the three approaches outlined above—namely, that the branch location decisions
of banks should be directly influenced by the location decisions made earlier by
other banks, over and above any publicly observable direct indicators of the profit
potential of a neighborhood. However, for purely illustrative purposes, we present
in the Appendix a model of bank branch location that yields herding based on an
information externality along the lines of Lang and Nakamura (1993). We outline
our empirical strategy in more detail in the next section.
4. Empirical strategy and data
We have made a prima facie case for the hypothesis that rational herding provides at
least a partial explanation for the clustering of bank branches described in Section 2.
The main competing hypothesis, which we also noted earlier, is that the clustering
of bank branches is driven entirely by the fact that the demand for banking services
is itself clustered. In this section,we outline a simple test of branch herding that
allows us to distinguish, empirically, between these two competing hypotheses. We
10
also describe the data we use to implement the test.
4.1. A test of herding
We adopt a reduced form approach in testing for herding. Our starting point is the
expression for the process generating branch-level profits:
njt = Xjta + 6Njt + ejt (4.1)
Here irjt represents the profits from operating a branch in tract (or neighborhood)
j , starting in time period t.u Xjt is a vector of demographic and other factors
at time t that affect the expected profitability of operating a branch in tract j
and Njt is the number of existing branches in tract j at the beginning of period t.
These variables are assumed to be observable to us, as well as to the banks. The
disturbance term, ejt, captures any factors affecting branch-level profits that we
assume, for the moment (see the discussion in the next subsection), neither we nor
the banks observe.
In the absence of any positive locational externalities—i.e., increased profits from
locating close to other branches—Njt simply proxies for the degree of bank compe-
tition in the tract, ceteris paribus.15 Increased competition within a neighborhood
is likely to decrease branch-level profits, and so we expect the coefficient on Njt to
be negative, or at least non-positive, i.e., 6 < 0.
The test of herding that we carry out is based on the simple proposition that,
as long as banks base their branch location decisions on the profit potential of a
neighborhood, in the absence of any herding, the reduced form expression for the
number of branch openings in a tract should mirror that for branch-level profits. In
particular, if we adequately control for the factors, Xjt, that independently affect
the expected profitability of operating in tract j , the number of branch openings in
a tract should, in the absence of herding, depend negatively (if at all) on the number
of existing branches in the tract since more branches indicate stiffer competition.
This suggests estimating the following test equation:
Ojt = Xjt0 + >yNjt + ujt (4.2)
where the dependent variable Ojt is the number of branch openings in tract j during
period t, and the other variables are as defined above. Under both the competing
hypotheses, the coefficients, /?, on the vector of profit factors, Xjt, should quali-
tatively match those in equation (4.1). In the absence of herding behavior of the
sort described in Section 3, the effect of Njt should also match that in (4.1)—i.e., 7
should be less than or equal to zero.
On the other hand, if banks herd (i.e., between two otherwise equally attractive
tracts, they choose the tract with more branches), the effect of Njt on subsequent
branch openings is the sum of two opposing forces. The competition effect implies
that we ought to observe relatively fewer branch openings in tracts with relatively
more branches at the beginning of the period. But a second, opposing influence,
14
 As the basic unit of analysis in this paper is a tract rather than a bank, to save on notation,
we do not explicitly incorporate the obvious heterogeneity that exists among banks.
We detail in Section 6 how such positive locational externalities might arise, and discuss how
they affect the interpretation of our test of herding.
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arises from the fact that tracts with a greater number of existing branches will attract
more branches if banks herd. Although the overall effect of Njt is indeterminate
under the herding hypothesis, a positive correlation between the initial number
of branches and subsequent branch openings would suggest herding behavior in
branching.
Bank branch location data offer several advantages in testing for herding be-
havior. First, because banks rely substantially on public census data when making
their branch location decisions, we are better able to control for the information
available to banks, and hence are able to more cleanly identify herding.16 This con-
trasts with, for instance, the study by Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) of the
trading patterns of 274 mutual funds between 1975 and 1984. They report small but
statistically significant comovements (i.e., buying and selling the same stock at the
same time) in the quarterly stock holdings of these funds. They do not, however,
control for any public information flows (e.g., earnings announcements) that may
have driven these comovements. The "herding" that they report may, therefore,
simply reflect the fact that fund managers responded independently but similarly to
the arrival of common, new information.17
A second advantage of our data is that the order in which the firms acted is
clearly indicated. Relating the branch opening decision to the spatial distribution
of existing branches provides a natural way of examining the influence of early-
movers on the actions of later agents. Other empirical papers on herding have
often had to rely instead on a priori identification of "leaders" and "followers". For
instance, Jain and Gupta (1987), which tests for herding in international lending by
U.S. banks during the 1970s, explores whether smaller U.S. banks followed money
center banks when lending abroad. They find that money center banks' portfolio
allocations did not Granger-cause smaller banks' allocations, and they conclude that
there is no evidence of herding in international lending. But this conclusion relies on
the authors' correctly identifying ex ante the leaders and followers in international
lending. If different banks acted as leaders when lending to different countries, the
Jain and Gupta test may not pick up herding.
Perhaps the closest in spirit to the approach we take is Calem (1995). He con-
ducts a test of Lang and Nakamura (1993) by regressing mortgage-loan approval
rates in U.S. urban counties in 1990-91 on 1989 home sales (and other controls).
Lang and Nakamura (1993) predict that past home sales should have a positive ef-
fect on current mortgage loan approval rates. Calem finds just such an effect, and he
concludes that the data support the Lang and Nakamura (1993) model. However,
he finds this effect only in non-minority tracts, a troubling result because the Lang
and Nakamura (1993) model predicts that the information externality is strongest
in areas with thin home sales (and minority areas have fewer sales). Moreover, the
positive correlation between past home sales and current mortgage approval rates
16It is, of course, still possible that despite our efforts to be comprehensive, banks have access to
information that we do not. We consider this possibility in the next section when we discuss the
results of our basic test of herding.
Partly this is a matter of definition—i.e., how broady one defines "herding". As we mentioned
at the outset, we follow the theoretical literature (see Devenow and Welch (1996)) and reserve
the term "herding" for situations in which the actions of agents directly influence the actions of
other agents, and this type of imitative behavior raises the possibility of systematically sub-optimal
outcomes. The distinction is also important in another respect which is that "herd behavior" as
we choose to define it potentially justifies some form of government intervention.
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even in non-minority areas may be the result of serially-correlated demand shocks,
a possibility Calem is unable to control for using cross-sectional data.
4.2. Data
We estimated the test equation using data on commercial bank branch openings
in New York City census tracts between July 1, 1990 and June 30, 1995 (and to
a more limited extent, branch openings between July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1985).18
These data were obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC)
Summary of Deposits database, an annual series which lists the street addresses of
all bank branches as of June 30th of each year. We used these street addresses
to map each branch to a census tract and were thus able to obtain the number of
bank branches in each census tract in each of the five years.19 If a branch address
appeared for the first time in a tract in June of a given year, we recorded that as a
branch opening some time in the preceding twelve months.20
Our choice of a census tract as the basic geographical unit of analysis—the area
j in the test equation—was based largely on data considerations. But it appears
to correspond fairly well with what banks themselves use. For example, as men-
tioned earlier, a prominent market research and consulting firm that provides banks
with site analysis services to aid their branch-location decisions reports that banks
typically define the "trade area" of a branch to consist of a geographic area encom-
passing 2000-2500 customers. The average New York City census tract had 1253
households.
As controls for the potential profitability of operating a branch in a census tract,
we use several population characteristics and indicators of business activity. These
variables are described in Table 3. In addition to census tract population size,
median family income, poverty rate, race and education, we include the fraction of
population over the age of 65 because the supply of core deposits by the elderly
may be relatively interest insensitive, making them more profitable bank customers.
We include the fraction of renter-occupied housing units and the median value of
housing in a tract as possible correlates of the size of the home mortgage market in
an area. Median housing values may be also correlated with the real estate costs of
operating a branch. We include these variables because they are strongly correlated
with the number of branches in each census tract.21 Moreover, market research firms
18Thrifts (savings banks and savings and loans) are excluded partly because thrifts are not perfect
substitutes for commercial banks. Unlike banks, thrifts primarily make mortgage loans. Thrifts are
excluded partly for data reasons; we are unable to get thrifts' branch locations for the early 1980s.
If banks do in fact consider thrift branch locations when locating bank branches, dropping thrifts
from the data creates a measurement error in the number of existing branches, Njt, which will bias
its coefficient toward zero.
Off-site ATMs are not included as branches in the FDIC's Summary of Deposits database. Hence,
only full-service branches are included in the data and in our analysis. Dropping ATMs should not
affect results here because 75 percent of ATMs are located inside branches (American Banker,
November 30, 1996).
19The details of the mapping procedure are available upon request.
20
 No te t h a t th is p rocedure yields the gross n u m b e r of branch openings in a t r ac t . We use
gross openings r a the r t h a n ne t openings—i.e. , gross openings minus closings—because the factors
under ly ing closings are often qui te different (see Section 2) from those influencing openings . We
should point out also that if a branch changed hands but remained at the same street address we
did not record this event as an opening.
21
 Based on a regression of the existing number of branches (note, not openings) in a tract on
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that help banks locate branches rely on similar census information when conducting
site analyses.
As indicators of business activity in a tract we include the number of people
working in a tract (provided by the Census Bureau in a customized data file us-
ing the Bureau's 1990 Journey to Work data), and a dummy indicator variable for
whether the tract is a net importer of workers. Typically, we would expect com-
mercial areas to be net importers and residential areas to be net exporters. We
also include the percentage of each tract's land area that is devoted to commer-
cial, industrial, and residential purposes using data provided by the New York City
Planning Department.22
The demographic and business activity variables listed above describe the en-
dowment of the census tracts as of 1990. We also include as controls, changes in the
population characteristics of each census tract between 1980 and 1990. The potential
future profits from operating in a tract depend not only on the current characteristics
of the tract but also on future conditions. To the extent that past changes predict
future changes, the measured changes in demographic variables should partially con-
trol for expected future demographic changes in the tract. Moreover, expectations
of future changes in real estate prices should be captured by the median housing
value variable if such expectations are capitalized into current prices.
5. Evidence on herding
In this section we first report the results of our basic test of herding. We find that,
consistent with the hypothesis of herding, banks tend to open branches in tracts
where there are already other branches, ceteris paribus. We then carry out a test
of the robustness of this finding. This further test is motivated by our concern that
the statistically significant positive relationship that we take as evidence of herding
may be spurious, arising instead from unobserved (to us, but not to the banks)
determinants of profitability.
5.1. Basic results
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 display our basic results.23 They show that after
controlling for census tract characteristics, the number of bank branches in a tract
at the beginning of the period is positively correlated with the number of branch
openings over the subsequent year, at least in those tracts with low-to-moderate
number of branches. Column (1) report Poisson estimates, and column (2) reports
ordered-Logit estimates.24 The Poisson point estimates suggest that the number
these tract-level variables. Results are available upon request.
22
 Land-use data are from the New York City Planning Department's 1995 Land Use Data Files.
This database tracks the actual uses of real estate, not what the area is zoned for.
The estimated equation differs from (4.2) only in that we have included a squared term (in the
number of existing branches) to allow for possible nonlinearities.
24Poisson estimation seems natural here since branch openings are count data. Such estimates
are also relatively easy to interpret. However, the Poisson estimator assumes that the opening of a
branch in a tract does not affect the probability of subsequent openings. Since this is not true under
the hypothesis of herding, we also provide Ordered Logit estimates. The dependent variable—the
number of branch openings—was top coded in the Ordered Logit estimation into four categories: 0
branch openings, 1 branch opening, 2 openings, and 3 or more openings.
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of initial branches is positively correlated with subsequent openings until the ini-
tial branch count is about fourteen. Thereafter, the two are negatively correlated.
This is consistent with herding dominating openings behavior at relatively thinly-
branched tracts. When there are many branches in a tract, stiff competition may
discourage further branch openings. However, only three tracts had more than four-
teen branches in 1995. Hence, herding dominates in 99.5 percent of the tracts with
branches. Moreover, this "herding effect" is large. The Poisson estimates suggest
that the expected number of annual branch openings in a tract with two branches
is 33 percent greater than an otherwise identical tract with just one branch at the
beginning of the year.
Interestingly, few of the other tract-level variables had a significant impact on
the number of branch openings. This may be due to the relatively small number
of branch openings and the resulting low power of the tests here. Nevertheless, the
estimates indicate that banks appear to find commercial tracts, tracts that attract
many commuters, and heavily populated tracts to be relatively more attractive.
They appear to have found residential areas and poorer areas unattractive. Minority
tracts also attract fewer branch openings, but this may be due to profitability factors
that are correlated with the racial composition of a tract.
Table 5 contains some robustness tests. This table summarizes results from esti-
mating the model in Table 4 on several sub-samples. To save space, we report only
the coefficients on the initial branch count. A potential problem with the results
in Table 4 arises from the fact that we pool five annual cross-sections of data when
estimating the model. The error term of the model for a given tract may well be cor-
related over time because there may be unmeasured tract features that change little
if any over back-to-back years.25 We address this problem indirectly by re-estimating
(4.2) as a single cross-sectional regression with the dependent variable redefined as
the cumulative number of branch openings over the five-year period, 1990-1995. We
regressed this variable on the tract conditions in 1990. The results we obtained are
shown in the second panel of Table 5. The point estimates are comparable to those
in Table 4 (reproduced in the top panel of Table 5 for comparison).
We next re-estimated the model in Table 4 excluding head office locations from
the sample. The process of locating a head office may be quite different from that
of locating a regular branch. For example, the potential for deposit taking from
and lending in the particular neighborhood where the office is located may be less
important for a head office than for a regular branch. Also, head offices are more
likely to be located in a major commercial center such as midtown or downtown
Manhattan. Such clustering of headoffices in heavily-branched areas may skew our
results in favor of finding herding effects to the extent that we do not completely
control for the commercial characteristics of a tract. The middle two panels in Table
5 show our estimates of the same location model without head offices for the 1992-95
period.26 These results are also consistent with herding.
Finally, we re-estimated the openings model using branch openings data for the
1980-85 period (bottom two panels, Table 5). We obtained the same qualitative
result of herding. The point estimates of the effect of the initial number of branches
25Despite this problem, we pooled the annual data because the number of openings and the
number of initial branches in a tract varies over the five-year period. Pooling ensures that we use
this information when estimating the correlation between openings and the initial branch count.
We could reliably identify head offices only for the 1992-95 period.
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is bigger than for the 1990s, but this is probably because we had fewer controls for
tract profitability for the 1980-85 period. (We do not have data on the extent of
commercial activity in tracts in the 1980s, nor do we have measures of the changes
in the demographic variables between 1970 and 1980.)
5.2. A further test
Tables 4 and 5 indicate an apparent statistically significant positive effect of the
number of existing branches on subsequent branch openings. We now investigate
the possibility that this finding may be spurious. Our concern here is that Njt
may simply be picking up the influence of tract characteristics that we have not
controlled for, but banks are able to observe. Although we have tried to be fairly
comprehensive in including an extensive array of tract characteristics that might
independently affect the profitability of operating in a tract, banks may be privy
to more information than is available to us. For instance, banks often commission
targeted market surveys of potential locations in addition to relying on publicly
available information from sources such as the census.
More formally, we consider the possibility that there might be unobserved (to us)
serially correlated tract-level characteristics (represented by Zjt) that affect branch
profitability. Again, this is a concern only in that banks might observe these char-
acteristics whereas we do not. In other words, we imagine that the "true" process
generating branch-level profits is given by:
iTjt = Xjta + 6Njt + Zjt + ejt (5.1)
where:
Zjt = pZj,t-i + ejt (5.2)
With banks basing their decisions on profit considerations, openings are then gen-
erated according to:
Ojt = Xjt/3 + jNjt + Zjt + ujt (5.3)
Clearly, since Njt = Ojj-i + Njj-i — CJJ-I(where Cjt is closings), given that (from
(5.3)) Ojj-i is partly determined by Zj^-\, Njt will be correlated with ZJJ-I- This
in turn implies that Njt will be correlated with Zjt if, as we have assumed in (5.2)
above, Zjt is serially correlated. Under this scenario, estimation of equation (4.2),
which does not control for Zjt, will suffer from omitted variable bias. And this may
yield a positive statistically significant estimate of the coefficient on the existing
number of branches even where there is no herding and the true coefficient on Njt
in equation (5.3) is 7 < 0.
One possible solution for this problem is to assume that the tract information
observed by the bank but not by us {Zjt) is time invariant, and use our panel data to
estimate an equation with tract fixed effects. Unfortunately, a fixed-effects Poisson
(or Ordered Logit) estimation procedure will not produce consistent estimates of
the number of initial branches because this variable is the sum of previous branch
openings. (That is, the number of existing branches in any given year, being a
function of lagged dependent variables (i.e., past openings), is pre-determined but
not exogenous.)
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Instead, we pursue an alternative "fix" by testing for the severity of the omit-
ted variable bias. Suppose that, in the estimation of (4.2), the positive coefficient
on Njt is being generated by the fact that Njt is serving as a proxy for unob-
served/unmeasured demand factors. Then, because the branch-openings equation,
in the absence of herding, mirrors the equation for profits, if we were to estimate
equation (4.1), in which branch profitability is the dependent variable, the coeffi-
cient on Njt should suffer from a similar omitted variable bias. In other words,
estimation of (4.1) should also yield a spurious positive coefficient suggesting that
the profitability of branches in a tract is positively correlated with the number of
branches in the tract.
If, on the other hand, the positive correlation between branch openings and
existing branches does in part reflect herding, the coefficient on Njt in the branch-
profits equation should be negative because of the increased competition from the
larger number of branches.
We cannot directly estimate (4.1) because we do not have direct measures of
branch profits. However, deposits held at a branch are a reasonable proxy for branch
profits. The principal function of bank branches is to gather deposits. Branches play
only a limited role in lending. Credit card loans are typically originated nationwide
by centralized operations of specialized credit card banks. Similarly, mortgage ap-
plications are often processed and approved at centralized mortgage lending units,
not in branches (at least in large banks).
If branches play any role in lending, it is in small business lending. Even here,
branches are of limited importance. A 1995 survey by the Consumer Bankers'
Association showed that while a majority of banks relied on branches to supply
deposit services to small business customers, branches played a much smaller role
in lending. Although 69 percent of the seventy two large banks surveyed said that
they relied on branches for small business deposit services, only 26 percent said that
they used branches to originate loans, and only 8 percent said that their branches
underwrite loans (Allen (1995)). Anecdotal evidence confirms this pattern holds in
New York. Several banks in the area solicit, process, approve and maintain small
business loans from "'loan centers" that cover a large area.27
Table 6 shows the results from estimating regressions of the average deposits per
branch (in 1000s of dollars) in a census tract at time t on the number of branches
in that tract at time t (and all other tract features used as controls in Table 4).28
The dependent variable in the top panel in Table 6 is the average value of total
deposits per branch in each census tract (for those tracts with at least one branch)
for 1990-95 and for 1984-85. (Data for previous years of the 1980s were unavailable.)
We find that the number of branches is negatively correlated with average branch
deposits in relatively thinly-branched tracts (up to six branches in the 1990s and
four branches in the 1980s). That is, an increase in the number of branches appears
to be associated with decreased revenues. And this effect is large; the coefficient
27Even if branches are relevant to producing small business loans, deposits held at a branch
are likely to be positively correlated with the amount of small business loans associated with that
branch because such loans involve the borrower opening a deposit account (and this account is
likely to be booked to the branch involved in originating the loans).
28Deposit data are also from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits database. Only deposits held by
individuals, partnerships and corporations are included. Government deposits are dropped because
location is assumed to play only a small part if any in the holding of government deposits.
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estimates suggest that adding a branch to a single branch tract over the 1990-95
period decreases total deposits by $25 million (which amounts to 16 percent of the
unconditional mean total deposits at the typical branch in New York City of $155
million).
While we have argued that deposits are a reasonable proxy for branch profits,
not all deposits are equally profitable. Transactions deposits (checking accounts)
are typically less profitable than are non-transactions (savings and time deposits)
deposits.29 Moreover, depositors who maintain a high balance are probably more
lucrative. We do not have data on average account size. However, we can control
for the type of deposit. The dependent variable in the bottom panel in Table 6 is,
therefore, the value of non-transactions deposits (savings and time deposits) held
at the average branch in a tract at time t for the period 1980-85. (Non-transactions
deposits data are unavailable for the 1990s). These results mirror those in the top
panel in suggesting that branch profitability decreases with the number of branches
in a tract.. We conclude that the apparent herding of bank branches is not due to
unmeasured profitability differences across census tracts, at least not for relatively
thinly branched tracts.
6. Interpreting the evidence
The results reported in the previous section indicate that the number of existing
branches in a tract has a positive, statistically significant effect on the number of
subsequent openings and suggest, moreover, that this effect is not spurious. We
interpret this as evidence of rational herding by banks, of the sort described in
Section 3. But economic theory suggests at least two other categories of explanations
for the clustering of firms, in which the number of firms located in an area directly
influences the location decisions of subsequent firms.
The first set of potential explanations has to do with the presence of positive
locational externalities.30 These externalities may arise in a number of ways. For
instance, the clustering of firms, by reducing consumers' search costs can increase
aggregate demand. Dudey (1990) identifies conditions for an equilibrium where
such clustering occurs as firms tradeoff' the increased competition from locating
close to competitors against the increased demand from such agglomeration. This
explanation for the clustering of bank branches would be plausible if banking services
were "search goods"—i.e., durable goods that are purchased fairly infrequently; that
seems unlikely, however, given the survey findings mentioned in Section 2, which
indicate that bank customers appear to value proximity to their bank and that the
average bank customer visits a branch three times a month.31
Positive locational externalities might also arise if existing bank branches, through
their lending operations, raise the deposit potential of a neighborhood. The problem
29
 Checking accounts are costly because processing check transactions is costly. These costs are
thought to out-weigh the interest cost of savings and time deposits.
30
 As Devenow and Welch (1996) point out, the clustering of firms because of positive locational
externalities (or in their terminology, payoff externalities) can also be considered a form of rational
herding.
Note though that the locational externalities that arise from reductions in travel costs might
well explain why, within a neighborhood, ret ail businesses tend to locate along the main commercial
thoroughfare.
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with this explanation is that to the extent that banks enjoy first-comer advantages,
individual banks ought to be able to internalize these dynamic externalities by ex-
panding the scope of their operations within a neighborhood.
A second possible explanation for clustering is provided by models where in the
presence of exogenous restrictions on price competition, firms compete for market
share through locational choice.32 Apart from the fact that such models yield clus-
tering equilibria only for certain configurations of the spatial distribution of demand,
configurations that seem unlikely to correspond to the distribution of demand for
banking services in New York City, the assumption that locational choice is the only
dimension along which banks compete seems unreasonable. While it is true that un-
til the early 1980s banks were subject to strict interest rate regulation—which might
be thought of as a restriction on price competition—many of these regulations were
eased during the 80s, and even in the 1970s there is ample anecdotal evidence that
banks competed through other means such as special promotional efforts.
These alternative explanations of branch clustering share a common prediction:
clustering should increase branch profitability. That is, in terms of our notation, in
the expression for branch-level profits:
njt = Xjta + SNjt + ejt
the coefficient on the number of existing branches should be positive, i.e., 6 > 0. To
the extent that deposits are an adequate proxy for profits, the results reported in
Table 6 reject this hypothesis—average branch-level deposits drop as the number of
branches in a tract goes up, at least for the range of branches found in most tracts.
Hence, we discount such explanations.
In contrast, the models of branch herding we discussed in Section 3 do predict
that branch clustering can lower earnings. For example, information cascade models
suggest that banks may herd and over-enter an area, driving down profits. Moreover,
this effect can persist for two reasons: first, branch closures may be costly (and in
Section 2 we provide some indirect evidence that this is the case); second, even
if profits are lower in heavily-branched tracts, as long as banks continue to earn
positive profits, there may be little incentive to explore the possibility that other,
currently virgin tracts, may generate higher profits.
7. Conclusion
Bank branches in New York City tend to be spatially clustered. This unevenness
has attracted considerable attention, both in the popular media and in policy cir-
cles because community groups argue that a bricks-and-mortar branch presence
is important for access to banking services. In this paper we explored empirically
whether the apparent clustering of bank branches can be at least partially attributed
to rational herding by banks. We find that even after controlling for the expected
profitability of operating a branch in an area, branch openings follow other, existing
branches. Moreover, such bandwagon behavior appears to reduce branch profits.
These findings, combined, suggest that herd behavior may be a factor in the branch
location decisions of banks.
'The first model of this kind appeared in Hotelling (1929).
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The primary implication of our finding that banks may be engaging in herd be-
havior is that the observed distribution of bank branches is potentially more skewed
than the distribution of demographic and economic factors that affect branch prof-
itability. Some neighborhoods may have an excessive number of branches while
others remain underserved. In such a situation, there may be a possible governmen-
tal role in influencing the branch location decisions of banks. Unless the government
is itself better informed than banks about the profit potential of different neighbor-
hoods (which seems unlikely), the obvious policy instrument would be some form
of subsidy that encourages experimentation, e.g., a subsidy to banks that open
branches in virgin territory. There may also be a more indirect role in encourag-
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Appendix
In this appendix we present a simple model of bank branch location which yields
rational herding based on an informational externality along the lines of Lang and
Nakamura (1993).
Suppose that the (true) profitability of operating a branch in tract j is given by:
TTJ = Xj/3 - 6(Nj + 1) + VJ
where Xj is a vector of observable characteristics of the tract, Nj is number of
existing branches in the tract, 6 > 0 captures the possible (adverse) effect on profits
from competition among branches in the tract, and Vj is an unobserved tract-specific
effect. We assume that there is an exogenously given probability, A, that a bank,
i, will consider opening a branch in tract j . Once a bank decides to explore the
possibility of opening a branch in tract j , the bank receives a noisy private signal, u>ij,
say from a site analysis it commissions, as well as Nj noisy signals, uJkj, k = 1,..., Nj,
e.g., from the deposit levels of the Nj existing branches, about the profitability of
operating in tract j . Let:
= TTJ + r]kj rjkj ~ i.i.d N(0, a*)
The bank uses these signals to update its priors about the unobserved tract-effect, Vj.
We assume that the bank has unbiased priors regarding the value of Vj] specifically
we assume that the bank's prior \ij is normally distributed with mean Vj and variance
We assume that the bank is risk-averse and that its preferences can be repre-
sented by the exponential utility function:
C/"(TT7-) = - - -e~a7Ti
a a.
The bank therefore decides to open a branch in tract j only if:
i.e., if its expected utility from opening a branch, given its prior, and given the signals
it receives, is positive. Given the assumption of normality, and the exponential
utility specification, this can be rewritten as:
E[U(TYJ) I Ujifij] = aE[7Yj | ujjifij] - -a2V[irj | iVj]^] > 0
where E[.} is the expectation and V[.\, the variance, of TTJ, given u)j and fij.
Now, the conjugacy property of the normal distribution implies that the bank's




Keeping in mind the assumption of unbiased priors, the expected profitability of
operating in tract j can then be written:
El*, | Wj-^j] = Xrf - S(Nj + 1)+ vj +
The variance of IVJ is given by:
I " .7
Thus a bank will open a branch in tract j only if:
1 ~2^2
z
 V iVi ' i/cryu '
and the probability of this occurring is given by:
2 2
- 6(Nd + 1) + vd] + ^ 2 [ ( j V + 7 y 2
In this expression the existing number of branches in a tract has two opposing effects
on an entrant's branch opening decision. The first effect is the "competitive" effect
captured by 6 which should encourage banks to open branches in thinly branched
tracts. The second effect, which does not appear in the "true" data generating
process for profits, but appears as a result of the bank's preference for increased
precision, tilts banks away from opening branches in thinly branched tracts. It is this
second effect which raises the possibility of rational herding. Note also, that in this
model, over-clustering due to herding is more likely to occur in the more profitable
tracts since these tracts are the ones where there are likely to be more branches to
begin with. Note also that the herding effect is strongest in thinly branched tracts.
This is seen clearly in that the variance of expected profits V[7TJ\UJJ; fij] decreases
at a decreasing rate in the number of branches, Nj. The reason is that adding a
branch in a thinly branched area generates relatively more information about tract
profitability than adding a branch to an area that already has many branches.
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Table 1
Spatial d is t r ibut ion of bank branches in New York City
June 1990
No. of branches














































































































Note: Using the census definition, the following five counties make up New York
city. Bronx, Kings, Queens, New York, and Richmond
Source: FDIC Summary of Deposits database, 1990-95. Covers full-service
branches of all commercial banks.
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Table 2
Spatial d is t r ibut ion of bank branch openings in New York City











































































































Summary statistics: New York City census tracts
Branches: June 1990





No. of tracts 2218 471
Population of tract 3304 4361
Fraction of population non-white 0.55 0.43
Fraction of population over age 65 0.13 0.15
Fraction of households poor 0.18 0.14
Fraction of population high-school graduates 0.67 0.73
Median household income ('$) 37043 45663
Fraction of housing units rental 0.65 0.69
Median value of owner-occupied housing" 164246 184130
Number of people working in tract 634 1715
Indicator that tract is net-importer of workers 0.24 0.46
Fraction of land area commercial 0.06 0.13
Fraction of land area industrial 0.05 0.05
Fraction of land area single-family residences 0.36 0.26
Fraction of land area multi-family residences 0.23 0.25
No. of existing branches: .June 1990 0.41 1.94



























No. of tracts 2218 142
Population of tract 3304 4728
Fraction of population non-white 0.55 0.37
Fraction of population over age 65 0.13 0.15
Fraction of households poor 0.18 0.14
Fraction of population high-school graduates 0.67 0.76
Median household income ($) 37043 53602
Fraction of housing units rental 0.65 0.72
Median value of owner-occupied housing 164246 175690
Number of people working in tract 639 3692
Indicator that tract is net-importer of workers 0.24 0.60
Fraction of land area commercial 0.06 0.21
Fraction of land area industrial 0.05 0.04
Fraction of land area single-family residences 0.36 0.16
Fraction of land area multi-family residences 0.23 0.27
No. of existing branches: June 1990 0.41 2.90




















Evidence on herding: basic results
Dependent variable: no. of branch openings, 1990-95
No. of branches
No. of branches squared
Population of tract
Fraction of population non-white
Fraction of population over age 65
Fraction of households poor
Fraction of population high-school graduates
Median household income ($)
Fraction of housing units rental
Median value of owner-occupied housing
Number of people working in tract
Indicator that tract is net-importer of workers
Fraction of land area commercial
Fraction of land area industrial
Fraction of land area single-family residences
Fraction of land area multi-family residences
No. of observations
Pseudo-R-square
Notes: (1) t-statistics appear below coefficient estimates. (2) Regressions based
on pooled annual tract-level data for New York City from 1990-95. (3) Regres-
sions include changes in tract-level demographic variables between 1980 and 1990;










































































Summary of regressions of branch openings on tract features
Dependent variable (sample)
No. of openings, annnually. of
Poisson
Ordered logit

































No. of openings, annually, of branches other than headoffices:
Poisson
Ordered logit
Cumulative no. of openings of
Poisson
Ordered logit
No. of openings, annnually, of
Poisson
Ordered logit
































































Notes: (1) t-statistics appear below coefficient estimates; (2) The regression
model used for the 1990-95 data is the same as that used in Table 4. The model
used for the 1980-85 data includes the following tract characteristics as controls:
population, race, poverty rate, age, rental rate, median income and median rent.
(3) "Cumulative openings" equals the total number of branches that opened in a








































Notes: (1) t-statistics appear below coefficient estimates. These t-statistics are
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors [White 1980]. (2) The re-
gression models used are the same as those used in Table 5. But the dependent
variable now is the average deposit level across all the branches in a tract in a given
year. Total deposits consist of all deposits held by everyone other than the gov-
ernment. Non-transactions deposits consist of savings and time deposits held by
everyone other than the government. (3) Reliable data on total non-government de-
posits are available only from 1984. Non-transactions data are not available for the
1990s.(4) Sample means are as follows: Mean total deposits at the typical branch
between 1990 and 1995 was $155 million: the mean for 1984-85 was $110 million;
mean non-transactions deposits for 1980-85 was $62 million.
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